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A CLERK'S-EYE VIEW OF KEYES V. SCHOOL DisTRICT No. 1
MARK TUSHNETt
ABSTRACT
After describing the political, intellectual, and doctrinal background
to Keyes v. School District No. 1, this Keynote Address narrates some
aspects of the way the deliberations in Keyes proceeded inside the Court.
For the Justices, Keyes was less a case about the standard for determining
when a Northern school board engaged in de jure segregation than it was
a case about using busing to remedy segregation anywhere in the coun-
try. It suggests that when understood against its background, Keyes
played an important role in first expanding, and then-because of the
reaction to it-narrowing the scope of desegregation efforts North and
South.
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INTRODUCTION
I am going to give what I call a clerk's-eye view of Keyes v. School
District No. 1.1 And I want to say something at the very beginning,
which I'll return to at the end. Sitting through this morning's panels,
which I found extremely interesting, I realized that the kinds of things
that I'm going to be talking about are, in many ways, of merely historical
interest, with apologies to Professor Patricia Limerick on this. That is,
the contemporary issues are quite different from the ones that concerned
the U.S. Supreme Court internally in the deliberations over Keyes. And
even the things that we saw coming up after Keyes have either faded
away or been transformed in important ways. That is not to say that
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard Col-
lege; J.D., Yale Law School; law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, United States Supreme Court,
1972 Term. This Keynote Address was delivered at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
on February 1, 2013, as part of the Denver University Law Review's symposium titled Forty Years
Since Keyes v. School District No. 1: Equality of Educational Opportunity and the Legal Construc-
tion of Modern Metropolitan America.
1. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
1139
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Keyes is an unimportant decision. Even today, I think Professor Myron
Orfield's comments on how Keyes could be used in inner-suburb cases
remain true. But it was a different kind of case from what it would be
now.
I was a clerk during the 1972-1973 Term. That's a long time ago,
and my memory has faded about some details. I'll say a bit about sup-
plementing my memory in a moment. In addition, I was working for Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall, and of course there was no question in our
chambers about what he was going to do. So, it was not, for the Justice's
three law clerks, an important case-for us as the drones who did some
of the work in the chambers. The most important work was deciding the
damn things, but we didn't have anything to do with that. After that, we
had things to do. Further, the work style in the office was that the only
written things that the clerks prepared for the Justice were the memoran-
da written when the application for review came in. When the Court
heard argument in cases granted during the preceding Term, we would
not have even written the certiorari memos. We didn't write bench mem-
oranda on the cases that the Court had granted argument in. In short, we
didn't write the certiorari memorandum on Keyes and didn't write any
other preliminary memos. Just as a footnote to this, the reason we didn't
write bench memoranda is that the Justice was very good at assimilating
very quickly from reading the briefs what the arguments were that he
cared about, and it wasn't going to help him for us to go through the ar-
guments in detail. He used the certiorari memo just before oral argument
in the case at issue to trigger his recollection of the relevant arguments.
That's a part of the context of my recollections.
Some of what I have to say is confirmed, in its broad outlines, by
what I've read about the Court's deliberations in the recently published
biography of Justice Brennan 2 and in The Brethren,3 which actually has a
reasonably extensive discussion of it. I do want to say something about
the discussion in The Brethren, which had some bearing on a clerk's-eye
view of the problem. The authors' sources were primarily law clerks, and
there are two characteristics of law clerks worth mentioning. One is,
they're young compared to the Justices, and inexperienced. And they're
not grown-ups. I include myself in that category: I wasn't a grown-up
then, either. And the Justices are grown-ups. And, secondly, the law
clerks are only there for a year. As a result, they don't have a time-based
perspective on the interactions of the Justices. In The Brethren, the law
clerks' inexperience in the world led whoever it was who talked to the
book's authors about this case to miss some of the psychological dynam-
ics of what was going on with Justice Blackmun, which I'll talk about in
2. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010).




a moment. They say everybody was worried about what Justice
Blackmun was going to end up doing. I don't think that Justice Brennan,
the author of the opinion, worried for a minute about what Justice
Blackmun would end up doing because he knew the kind of person Jus-
tice Blackmun was better than the law clerks did.
The Brethren describes Chief Justice Warren Burger's efforts to
manipulate the timing of the outcome in Keyes and consolidate it with
Bradley v. School Board, a case involving Richmond, Virginia, that was
coming to the Court. Woodward and Armstrong say that the Chief Jus-
tice thought he could win Bradley, from his point of view, more easily.
At one point, they say Chief Justice Burger had overplayed his hand. I'm
pretty sure that by the time that Keyes was being discussed, most of the
Justices had figured out that Chief Justice Burger was an inept Machia-
vellian. He was trying to manipulate the Court, but they all knew he was
terrible at it. And so, I don't think they took anything that he did that had
a more or less transparently political motivation at all seriously. That's
the structure of where my thinking comes from.
I. THE POLITICAL STRAND: THE POLITICS OF BUSING
It was hard for me to figure out how to tell the story of the delibera-
tions because three elements are very closely intertwined, and for narra-
tive purposes, I have to pull them out of the story. And in talking about
one of the strands, I have to say some things about the other strands. The
first strand is what I call political. From the point of view of what was
going on inside the Court, Keyes was not a case about the standard for
determining whether a constitutional violation had occurred (what I'll
talk about later as the violation problem). It wasn't a case about the vio-
lation; it was a case about remedies (that is, it was a case about busing).
President Richard Nixon had made four appointments to the Court. We
now know that President Nixon didn't care about very many things when
he was picking Justices. He had one or two items that were litmus test
issues. They were litmus test issues for him because-and this is im-
portant in thinking about the Court as a whole today-he wanted to make
sure that his Court appointments would strengthen the Republican Party
going forward. And so, he wanted to ensure that Republican Party strate-
gy was a combination of the Southern strategy, pulling Southern whites
away from the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party, and a
Northern ethnic-working class strategy, which had the same goal, to pull
that constituency away from the Democratic Party and into the Republi-
can Party. Well, what issues would be litmus tests for that? It turns out
4. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd by an equally
divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
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that there are only a couple, and busing was one of them. So, the four
appointees were there, in some sense, because of the busing issue.
The year before, the Court had gone through a big struggle over
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education involving the
Charlotte school district in which the only issue was whether busing
would be validated as a remedy.7 And after a great deal of pulling and
hauling inside the Court, mostly overcoming Chief Justice Burger's in-
eptness in trying to pursue President Nixon's strategy, the Court did vali-
date busing as a remedy. But the issue politically didn't go away and
outside the Court, there were large controversies about busing in Boston
and in Detroit. With Detroit and Richmond as well, there was a looming
question about how extensive busing would be. The legal issue was
whether a Court, finding a violation in one district, could order other
neighboring districts into the remedy. Justice Lewis Powell was going to
be recused in the Richmond case because he'd been chair of the Rich-
mond and Virginia school boards. All of these cases were part of the
Court's mental universe when thinking about Keyes. Professor Orfield
mentioned Davison Douglas's book called Jim Crow Moves North,
which deals with Northern segregation issues up to 1954.8 But it's a good
label for what was going on in the Court. The cases challenging segrega-
tion in the North nationalized the issue of busing and thus, at some level,
played into President Nixon's strategy of pulling white Northerners away
from the Democratic Party. Keyes was the first non-Southern school de-
segregation case that the Court had confronted, so all of these issues
about the national scope of the issue and the extent of busing were part of
the background that the Court was considering.
II. THE INTELLECTUAL STRAND: DESEGREGATION OR INTEGRATION?
The second strand is something that I call an intellectual strand, alt-
hough it's blended with a doctrinal one. This label isn't great, but the
intellectual question was whether the constitutional issue was an issue
about desegregation or integration. Doctrinally, since Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1)9 nineteen years earlier, the issue had always been
about desegregation. One of the central lines that arose immediately after
Brown was written by Judge John Parker in the decision after the remand
of the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott,o in which he said, quite
5. For President Nixon's nomination strategy, see KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON'S COURT:
HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 81 (2011).
6. 402 U.S. I (1971).
7. Id. at 30.
8. DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER NORTHERN
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1865-1954 (2005).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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accurately, that all that the Court had required was desegregation." It did
not require integration. That was doctrinally true. But culturally, at least
by 1970 and probably earlier, the issue in these cases had been under-
stood or assimilated as an issue of integration. And there was some doc-
trinal support for that. The difference between desegregation and integra-
tion has to do with the remedy-what you have to do after you find a
constitutional violation. If the constitutional issue was desegregation, all
you have to do, at least as it was then understood, is eliminate the use of
race as a reason for making school assignment decisions. If the constitu-
tional issue was integration, then what you have to do is make sure that
there are schools that are, as the terminology became, not racially identi-
fiable.
There was doctrinal support for the idea that the constitutional issue
was integration, although I'm not now sure whether this is something
that I'm now imposing on what was going on or something that was un-
derstood at the time. But the doctrinal support is that the remedy issue
and the remedy decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11)12
allowed for "all deliberate speed." 3 As Marshall, a litigator, said at the
time, if all you care about is eliminating race as a basis for decision mak-
ing, you can do that in six months. There'd be some administrative prob-
lems, but it's easy enough to get rid of that sort of stuff. Use neighbor-
hood school districts, neighborhood boundaries, and even use freedom of
choice. Just don't take race into account. That's easy. You don't need
deliberate speed to do that. So, the deliberate speed formulation implicit-
ly recognized that there was something more than removing race as a
basis for assignment. And then, in 1968, Green v. County School Board4
said, the goal is to achieve schools that are just schools (that is, schools
that are not racially identifiable).' 5 This was, again, in the context of a
Southern, previously de jure segregated school. You could say, well, this
was just a remedy problem for express desegregation, but the remedy
looks like integration. And so, I think by the 1970s, it was culturally be-
lieved that what school desegregation cases were about was achieving
integrated public schools.
I1. Id. at 777 ("Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes
away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words,
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as
occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or
state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals.").
12. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13. Id. at 301.
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
15. Id. at 442 ("The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other
courses which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to
convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."
(internal citation omitted)).
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III. THE DOCTRINAL STRAND: DE JURE OR DE FACTO?
The final, pure doctrinal element was whether there was a constitu-
tional violation only when segregation occurred de jure-by law-or
whether there could be a constitutional violation when schools were ra-
cially identifiable de facto. Again, the doctrine, at least as it had
emerged, was that only de jure segregation was a constitutional violation.
The origin of that is the line in Brown I, the violation decision, which
says segregation by law is likely to work damage to the hearts and minds
of schoolchildren in a way unlikely ever to be undone.16 It does say seg-
regation "by law," but the connection between the law part and the dam-
age to the hearts and minds was never really made in the Court's work.
And it was plausible to think that it was the fact of segregation, not the
fact of segregation by law, that did the damage that was articulated as
one of the Court's concerns.
Now back to politics. The de jure-de facto line generated resent-
ment in the South, and this was clearly on Justice Powell's mind during
Keyes. White Southerners said, Why are you making us go through all of
this trauma when you folks in the North have schools that are just as seg-
regated de facto as ours and you don't have to do anything about it? This
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation doesn't make
sense-white Southerners may have been right about that-and we really
resent having the costs of your social engineering, as it was put, imposed
on us when you're not imposing those same costs on yourself. And then,
of course, culturally, again, integration was seen as the goal. That's the
background.
IV. NARRATIVE: THE STORY OF KEYES INSIDE THE COURT
Now, here's the story of Keyes as I recall it and as supplemented by
additional material. Keyes was not one of the major Northern cases like
Kerrigan v. Morgan'7 from Boston or Milliken v. Bradley8 from Detroit.
From inside the Court-I hate to say this to an audience in Denver-it
was like, a desegregation case from New Rochelle, New York. Keyes
happened to be the Northern desegregation case that got to the Court.
The real places of concern were Detroit and Boston. The issues in Keyes
were, Was there a constitutional violation and, if so, what would the
remedy be? The issue of whether there was a violation was relatively
easy within the Court. It ended up being decided 7-1 that there was a
violation. Getting there was a little complicated, but from the very be-
16. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
17. 421 U.S. 963 (1975), denying cert. to 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), af'g sub nom. Morgan
v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
18. 418 U.S. 717 (1974), rev'g and remanding 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), af'g in part,
vacating in part 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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ginning, there were four votes to find a constitutional violation. 9 As he
was, in the early years at least, in many important cases, Justice
Blackmun was slow to come around. Justice Brennan got the assignment
and drafted an opinion finding a constitutional violation. Justice
Blackmun reacted to that by saying, I'm a little nervous about this. It
seems to be a little too broad and some of your language seems to be a
little too strong. The important point is that once he said that, there were
five votes. That is, he hadn't formally said he was going to join Justice
Brennan's opinion, but in the Court, when you say, I'm concerned about
your opinion in the following ways, you're saying, just tinker with it. Do
something, and I'll end up joining you. There was a discussion of Plyler
v. Doe20 this morning. Justice Brennan wrote that. Justice Powell was the
fifth vote in Plyler. Exactly the same kind of thing happened in Plyler.
Justice Brennan wrote a very strong opinion. Justice Powell said, well, I
sort of like the outcome that you reach, but I'm very concerned about
what you say in Parts II and III of the opinion. And Justice Brennan said,
outcomes are what matter. I'll take out Part II. And he just took it out.
And Justice Powell said, I appreciate what you've done on Part II; I'm
still concerned about Part III. And Justice Brennan said, okay with me.
He took out Part 1II. And Justice Powell then said, fine. So, once you do
that sort of thing, at least when you're dealing with Justice Brennan, the
game's over. And so, although Blackmun was slow to come around, eve-
rybody knew relatively early that there was going to be a finding of a
violation.
For reasons I'll get to in just a moment, Justice Powell, also early
on, got committed to the proposition that there was a constitutional viola-
tion, so that was six votes. Chief Justice Burger didn't like the outcome,
but he couldn't figure out what to do, basically. Justice Powell had taken
the laboring oar, and once Justice Powell's approach hadn't worked,
Chief Justice Burger just collapsed and concurred in the result without
saying anything. So, the violation issue was relatively easy. The litigants
presented the remedy issue in this way: If you found intentional segrega-
tory actions with respect to some part of the district, was it permissible to
include other parts of the district in the remedy? That was the legal issue.
But that's not how it was thought of inside the Court at the start. The
issue of remedy inside the Court was how much busing could you require
in grossly aggregated terms, not Park Hill versus whatever. It wasn't
thought of in such narrow terms because it was understood as a busing
case.
With respect to that, the central fact inside the Court was Justice
Powell's opinion. He circulated an opinion that said two things. First,
let's eliminate the de facto-de jure distinction. It doesn't make any sense.
19. Justice White recused himself from Keyes because of his ties to Denver.
20. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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He said, in effect, I'm a Southerner, and Southerners don't like it. Justice
Powell articulated all the kinds of things that I've said about the Southern
resentment of the de facto-de jure distinction. Now I'll bring Justice
Douglas in. He had long said-at least since Shelley v. Kraemer2 -that
de facto-de jure kinds of distinctions don't make sense. What you care
about is the underlying social reality. If there are segregatory outcomes,
you don't care where they come from; the Constitution says you can't
have them. That was his longstanding position. And so, when Justice
Powell circulated his opinion, Justice Douglas said, sure, sounds good to
me. But Justice Douglas overlooked the other part of Justice Powell's
opinion. Justice Powell said, in Part I, let's eliminate the de jure-de facto
distinction. But there's a trade-off. If we do that, what we have to do is
limit remedies quite sharply and, in particular, get rid of busing as a rem-
edy. So, we'll extend Brown across the country and make it easy to find
constitutional violations everywhere, but in exchange for doing that, you
people who have been pushing for desegregation should give up on bus-
ing as a remedy. It wasn't entirely clear, I think, what remedies he would
have allowed in light of Green; that is, he didn't seem to be challenging
the proposition that the goal was to achieve schools that were just
schools. How you would actually achieve that without busing remedies
wasn't clear. But it was clear that he wouldn't allow busing.
What then happened was this. You have Justice Douglas saying, fi-
ne, I'll go along with the first part of your opinion, not saying anything
about the second part. Justices Brennan and Marshall saw the threat on
the remedies side. At some level, both of them were sympathetic with the
argument that the de jure-de facto distinction was artificial. And so, what
they were looking for was a solution on the violation side that would let
the Court get at large swaths of Northern segregation, which in their
hearts they knew was de facto, without having to buy Justice Powell's
tradeoff. So, what Justice Brennan needed to do, was to articulate a rule
for finding a de jure violation that would be applicable to essentially eve-
ry Northern school district where there were racially identifiable schools.
That was his problem.
And his solution was the rule in Keyes: deliberate segregatory ac-
tions with respect to a significant portion of the district (the "significant"
was the concession that he made to Justice Blackmun) would trigger a
requirement of district-wide desegregation, or at least an authorization
for district judges to order district-wide remedies. So, if you found delib-
erate segregatory actions with respect to a significant portion of the dis-
trict, you had found de jure segregation of the district as a whole. That's
the doctrinal formulation that Justice Brennan came up with. And he was
confident that the courts could find such actions pretty much everywhere
21. 334 U.S. I (1948).
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in the North. And I suppose he must have been confident that district
judges in the North would make such findings.
One footnote here, I think, is probably relevant. I was a law clerk
for a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit in Detroit,
George Edwards. He was a great guy who had been a rising political star
in the Michigan Democratic Party until 1948, when he, as housing com-
missioner in Detroit, ordered the desegregation of the city's public hous-
ing, which destroyed his political career. So he went on to be a federal
judge. Bradley v. Milliken,2 2 the Detroit case, was going on while I was
clerking in Detroit for Judge Edwards and, of course, Judge Edwards
paid a lot of attention to it. The case had been assigned to a very con-
servative district judge named Stephen Roth. As the case came in and as
the facts were presented to him, Judge Roth found himself, contrary to
his initial inclinations, saying, you know, they really did set out to segre-
gate the schools in Detroit. The authorities really did say it. So, Judge
Roth, as Judge Edwards put it, had a conversion experience. This guy
who was really conservative entered an extremely sweeping remedial
order. Supreme Court Justices know the lower court judges. My guess is
that Justice Brennan knew that, in Richmond, a very liberal district judge
created this extensive remedy. In Detroit, a very conservative judge is-
sued the same kind of remedial order. Justice Brennan may have been
confident that district judges all over the country would find the kind of
things that Keyes authorized them to find and then, having found them,
would issue fairly extensive remedial orders. And that turned out to be
true. Again, Professor Orfield mentioned Columbus Board of Education
v. Penick23 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,24 also Sixth
Circuit cases, which is probably not irrelevant. Those cases were not
outside the normal bounds of what Northern school districts had done.
And so, it turned out to be true that the Keyes violation formula licensed
district judges to find constitutional violations in every Northern school
district where segregation was challenged and then to order fairly exten-
sive remedies. The outcome of that was that the line between de facto
and de jure segregation was further blurred because it didn't do any work
anymore. The definition of de jure had become so broad that, for all
practical purposes, everywhere you observed de facto segregation, you
could find its origins in law under the Keyes approach.
The problem with that is it goes back to Justice Powell's trade-off.
He said, okay, let's get rid of the line between de jure and de facto, but if
we do that, we're going to have to do something on the remedies side.
22. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), af'd in part, vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd and remanded, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
23. 439 U.S. 1348 (1978), rev'g 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), af'g in part, remanding in part
429 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
24. 433 U.S. 406 (1977), vacating and remanding sub. nom Brinkman v. Gilligan 539 F.2d
1084 (6th Cir. 1976).
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For all practical purposes, Keyes got rid of the line between de facto and
de jure and didn't do anything on the remedies side, or rather, the reme-
dies that Keyes authorized district judges to order were to be those used
in previous de jure cases. And what that did was to exacerbate the politi-
cal problems. Resistance to busing remedies, which were the remedies
licensed under Keyes, intensified in the North. In addition, and now I'm
approaching the conclusion, Bradley and Milliken were pending. The
district judges had ordered inter-district remedies, the consolidation of
central city and suburban districts for purposes of desegregation. Judge
Roth, whose case I was most familiar with because I had clerked in De-
troit, essentially created pie-shaped districts spreading out from the cen-
ter of Detroit into the suburbs. There was, of course, enormous resistance
to that in the suburbs. Many people had moved to the suburbs precisely
to avoid having their children attend schools with substantial minority
populations. So, there was enormous resistance to the remedies in Detroit
and Richmond. The extension of Keyes to everywhere in the North exac-
erbated the phenomenon of white flight-white parents moving out of
the city so as to avoid sending their kids to schools with substantial mi-
nority populations. The Court divided 4-4 in Bradley, the Richmond
case, with Justice Powell recused. The effect in Richmond was to elimi-
nate the inter-district remedy, but the real fact was once the Court divid-
ed 4-4 on that, everybody knew that as soon as Justice Powell could vote
in Milliken, he was going to vote against the inter-district remedy. And
indeed that's what happened. So, that's the story of Keyes from inside the
Court.
CONCLUSION
I want to conclude by coming back to something that I mentioned at
the beginning of my remarks. The issues that I've just gone through-
resistance to within-district remedies, white flight, and denial of inter-
district remedies-have now themselves been displaced in interesting
kinds of ways. The closest thing that is similar to Keyes is the phenome-
non that my former colleague, Sheryll Cashin, has written about, which
is the development of racially diverse inner suburbs. For all practical
purposes, you can't implement any corporeal strategies within core cit-
ies, the parts of the city that are racially identifiable. You just don't ac-
complish anything. What's happened is that minority families have
moved to inner suburbs, and the Keyes kinds of issues replicate them-
selves in the inner suburbs. But when that happens, the inner suburbs
suffer white flight to the outer suburbs. And so, the Keyes issues are
promising, I think, in inner suburban areas but are likely to face the same
kinds of difficulties of the transformation of those inner suburbs into
racially identifiable minority suburbs within a relatively short period of
time.
The reason I say that Keyes inside the Court may be of merely his-
torical interest is that the issues of achieving an integrated society that
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remain important, can't, at least as a constitutional matter, be addressed
within the courts. In Swann, Chief Justice Burger famously said, one
vehicle, the school bus, can only carry so much baggage.2 5 Inside the
Court, Justice Potter Stewart in effect said in Milliken, this is where I get
off the bus. And that's basically true about achieving integration. Schools
are important social institutions, but they can't any longer, if they ever
could, drive the process of integration.
25. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 23 (1971) ("The elimina-
tion of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by
efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle
can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown I to
seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although desegregation of
schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of discrimination." (emphasis added)).
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